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         Abstract: Offshore business is such an integral part of the financial sec-
tor that we can hardly imagine the world of money without it. Today we are 
as accustomed to offshore business as people were to slavery in the 18th and 
the 19th century when slave labour was considered normal and natural. How-
ever, it goes without saying that just like slavery, offshore zones are doomed 
to gradual decline because they function is parasitic. According to a study 
conducted by the international confederation Oxfam, offshore companies 
evade taxes for nearly $ 200 billion each year. In fact about 50% of Russia's 
assets, 57% of the Arab Emirates’ oil funds, and 30% of Africa's funds are 
hidden in offshore zones. According to the above report, 1% of the world 
population now have more wealth than the other 99%. The richest sixty peo-
ple have more money than three and a half billion poor people. Such inequali-
ty is possible only through the cooperation of offshore zones. The US Nation-
al Bureau of Economic Research estimates that about $ 5.6 trillion is kept in 
offshore zones around the world. This amount represents 8% of the global 
equity or 10% of the world's gross domestic product.2 
Keywords:  offshore business, money laundering, tax haven. 
JEL: H26. 
 
*     *    * 
Introduction: 
 
e come across the terms “offshore business”, “offshore zone”, “off-
shore company”, or other similar terms quite often in our daily life. 
They are associated with something not entirely legal and generally 
refer to fraudulent activities to the benefit of a certain groups of people. 
                                                          
1 Е-mail: p.vasileva@uni-svishtov.bg 
2 http://www.mediapool.bg/v-ofshorni-zoni-po-sveta-ima-56-triliona-dolara-news27 
3343.html 
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Notwithstanding the terminological variations, offshore business encompasses 
various institutions, regulations, mechanisms, and relationships that pose a 
challenge to those who are engaged to ensure its most valuable advantages – 
owner’s confidentiality and low (or zero) tax rates.    
 
*     *    * 
The most explicit feature of offshore companies is that they are regis-
tered outside the jurisdiction of the country in which they conduct their core 
business, i.e. they operate in countries that differ from the country of their 
registration. For example, Samsung and Sony operate in Bulgaria as offshore 
companies because they are registered as legal entities in other countries.  
Later on the meaning of the term “offshore company” was narrowed to 
refer to companies registered in offshore financial zones and regions that offer 
certain privileges for foreign firms, such as low or sometimes zero tax rates 
and registration fees, strict bank-client confidentiality and financial privacy, 
and low registration barriers. Usually such companies are exempt from corpo-
rate income tax and pay only a fixed annual fee. Their owners are not subject 
to personal income tax and are allowed to transfer their incomes abroad. An 
important condition, however, is that such a zone should be economically 
viable and easily accessible in terms of telecommunications and transporta-
tion. Currency control is usually extremely low. In fact, one of the most im-
portant advantages of the offshore centres is not their taxation regulations, but 
the opportunity for registration of a company through a natural person or an 
authorized law firm without revealing the identity of the actual owner, i.e. 
owner’s anonymity.  
To be considered a tax haven, the country must provide certain bene-
fits to the companies registered under its jurisdiction. Most offshore zones 
have specific characteristics - they offer advantageous financial and banking 
services and thus attract huge funds. 
In recent years, they have been subject to increasing pressure and scru-
tiny from the largest developed economies worldwide. They are referred to as 
non-cooperating countries because of their lack of transparency and reluc-
tance to cooperate in money laundering investigations. Therefore, the Organi-
zation for Economic Cooperation and Development has set up a special 
"blacklist” of uncooperative tax havens.  
Classic examples of offshore zones are the tropical islands – the Re-
public of Dominica, the Virgin Islands, the Cayman Islands, Mauritius, the 
Bahamas, the Seychelles, Cyprus, New Zealand, etc.  
The most common reason for establishing an offshore company is tax 
optimization. A properly structured offshore company may provide the fol-
lowing benefits: anonymity and data protection, confidentiality, protection 
Economic Archive 2/2018 
 
35 
from creditors, court receivables and distraints, cost optimization, significant-
ly simplified accounting requirements, and low bureaucracy.  
Tax havens have for many years been used by individual and corporate 
foreign investors to avoid taxation in the countries where their main business 
is conducted. This is why governments and mass media are often critical to 
offshore jurisdictions and the services they provide. 
Note, however, that each citizen of a given country has the legal right 
to register and run an offshore company. Most of the small island nations that 
are referred to as tax havens provide such an opportunity. In this respect the 
term “offshore business” is used with reference to international businesses 
and international taxation and planning. 
The above advantages of the tax havens attract not only large corpora-
tions but also an increasing number of medium and small-size companies. 
Most of these companies aim to evade taxation in their own countries or seek 
refuge from political and financial instability using tax legislation loopholes. 
Although tax havens are often associated with money laundered by global 
criminal organizations, virtually all transnational companies own legal entities 
registered in offshore zones. 
The low corporate income tax is the most typical feature of offshore 
zones. A company incorporated in the Bahamas is levied a lower income tax 
than a company registered in Bulgaria although all other taxes and fees may 
be the same. Let’s consider a company trading in computer equipment and 
registered in Mauritius (a popular offshore zone). The company operates and 
generates profits in Bulgaria. Were the company registered in Bulgaria, it 
would be subject to corporate income tax at a rate of 10%. In fact, should the 
owners of the company decide to distribute the profit through dividends, they 
would also be liable to additional 5% personal income tax. However, in Mau-
ritius the rate of the income tax is zero and the owner will not pay any taxes. 
The obvious question is whether this is legal. The answer to this question is 
quite difficult and ambiguous. According to our legislation, a 10% corporate 
income tax should be levied on the profits of all foreign companies operating 
in Bulgaria. By selling the computer equipment on the territory of our coun-
try, the company should be liable to pay the due tax. In reality, however, us-
ing various accounting techniques and legal loopholes the owner can opt for 
taxation in Mauritius and thus avoid or reduce the due taxes. This process is 
known as tax optimisation.   
Another significant benefit of offshore zones is owner’s anonymity. A 
business owner may want to keep his identity secret for a variety of reasons, 
such as business and financial risks, bad reputation, indebtedness, etc. 
Consider a person who has accumulated a large debt in our country 
and owns a real estate that that can be claimed and sold to satisfy his credi-
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tors. The owner is aware of what will happen and has transferred the title to 
this property to his company registered in Bulgaria. This, however, is not a 
solution to the problem because the creditors can look up the Commercial 
Register at any time and find out that he is the owner of the company and then 
make a legal claim for the asset anyway. This can be done by either declaring 
the acquisition of the asset to be null and void or by obtaining a writ of at-
tachment for the person’s equity in the company. Such a case would be quite 
different in Mauritius because there isn’t a public commercial register and the 
creditors cannot identify the actual owner of the company. Generally, the off-
shore zones would not disclose the identity of the owners of companies under 
their jurisdiction and therefore, even with the assistance of the state, the like-
lihood of identifying and bringing these owners to justice is very low.  
This is why, apart from political and economic stability, the third most 
important common feature of all offshore zones is their strict banking secrecy. 
Thus, by having liberal banking legislation that provides for unhindered regis-
tration of bank accounts on the one hand and an unconditional bank secrecy 
on the other, these zones guarantee maximum security and confidentiality of 
bank transactions. The abolition of bank laws often involves a limitation of 
international financial activities. The main segment - banking is the extraterri-
torial status that prevents it from any inconveniences and limitations. Coun-
tries with such policies are called banking havens. The legislation in these 
countries not only guarantees the secrecy of bank accounts but also the confi-
dentiality of the identity of the owners of these accounts. The disclosure of 
such information is considered illegal, and therefore it is very difficult to iden-
tify the account holders in these countries. It is even more difficult to identify 
the owners of the banks themselves. By providing complete banking secrecy 
to their clients, they enable them to accumulate wealth without paying any 
taxes. Bank secrecy is rooted in the centuries-old tradition of most Anglo-
Saxon countries for a tacit non-disclosure agreement between the bank and its 
client. Banks are liable under the civil and criminal law for any breach of this 
agreement. A historical example of such a strict banking secrecy are the fi-
nancial services in Switzerland. Any employee of a Swiss bank who discloses 
information about international financial transactions and/or account holders 
is subject to criminal prosecution. This regulation dates back to the 1940s 
when the German refugees transferred their funds to Swiss bank accounts to 
protect them from the Nazis. However, the bank secrecy regulation resulted in 
the protection of all accounts with German account holders regardless of 
whether they were members of the ruling Nazi party or the opposition.  
According to the Swiss legislation, banks must unconditionally pro-
vide the law enforcement authorities with information about their clients in 
cases of criminal proceedings. However, for civil cases the provision of such 
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information falls within the competence of the regional authorities. As a rule, 
foreign citizens are not entitled to require information about the clients of 
Swiss banks. 
The difference between Switzerland's legislation and the legislation in 
the other developed countries is that Swiss tax authorities do not have direct 
access to bank account information. They can obtain information about tax-
payers' bank accounts only if they request it directly from them rather than the 
management of the bank.  
However, the high degree of secrecy does not mean that Swiss banks 
receive less information than their foreign counterparts. A lot of money-
laundering operations have led to tougher requirements on bank supervision 
and client identification. The banks may provide information about their cli-
ents to the law enforcement authorities if the bank management is convinced 
that the client is involved in criminal activities. 
A significant part of the funds (about 40% of all transactions) trans-
ferred into Switzerland come from other offshore zones. To maintain the ut-
most secrecy and confidentiality of bank operations, the banks implemented 
special procedures with options for opening a bank account to an ID number 
or a nickname chosen by the client. This option increases the level of trust but 
does not make these accounts completely anonymous. The account holder’s 
identity is always known to the bank. Over the last decades, Switzerland has 
weakened the requirements for bank deposit secrecy.  
The level of banking secrecy varies according to the country. In all EU 
member-states, with the exception of Austria and Luxembourg, the breach of 
banking secrecy does not result in criminal prosecution. In Austria, pursuant 
to a special law enforced in 1979, a bank employee may be sentenced to a 
year's imprisonment or pay a fine equivalent to one year's salary for disclosure 
of information about a depositor. However, the bank may only provide client-
related data if requested by the court. In Luxembourg, a banking secrecy law 
enforced in 1981 allows banks to disclose client information in the event of a 
criminal case, but only with the consent of the Minister of Finance.   
Another characteristic of the offshore zones is the absence of limits on 
the amounts of currency exchanged and transferred. Foreign currency trans-
fers are not subject to control provided the funds are transferred from a source 
outside the offshore zone. If there are any limits, the clients are mainly inter-
ested in free transfer of funds held in accounts of other banks except offshore. 
It is fundamentally impossible to combine both tax evasion and the complete 
lack of risk of losing a deposit.  
The above characteristics of offshore zones cannot exist without mod-
ern communication centres and reliable operation, which require a well-
developed infrastructure. The attractiveness of the offshore zones largely de-
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pends on the level and quality of communications services. Generally, these 
centres have modern telecommunication equipment that provide the commu-
nication needed for financial transactions.  
The transportation infrastructure and means must be well-developed 
and modern as well. For example, there are two daily flights between the 
Cayman Islands and Florida. Many charter flights from the United States are 
used to ship large amounts of cash to offshore banks in the Bahamas. Similar 
transport and telecommunications services exist in the offshore zones of Pan-
ama and Hong Kong.  
However, even a full set of all the above characteristics would not be 
sufficient for the successful operation of an offshore zone if it does not have 
the right legislation. The choice of a location for the company’s headquarters 
as well as the legal form of the entity and its main activities is crucial. 
The general law allows for greater freedom of entrepreneurship, but at 
the same time almost always requires the assistance of a lawyer, as the legal 
system is quite sophisticated. However, it provides many opportunities for 
transfer of title to property rights from one country to another, which is par-
ticularly important for offshore clients.  
The last characteristic of offshore zones is the degree of satisfaction of 
the individual needs of the clients, namely: domestic transportation, medical 
services, adequate accommodation, personnel that speak foreign languages, 
availability of qualified specialists such as lawyers, notaries, accountants, IT 
specialists, etc. 
Registration fees vary from 3000 to 5000 USD depending on the type 
of company registered. They cover bank account, address, and office registra-
tion, a company logo and stamp, etc. The company is registered through prox-
ies. There are more than 20 companies in Bulgaria that provide offshore regis-
tration services. They are representatives of law firms that actually register 
such companies in the offshore zones. Once established in an offshore zone, 
the company is exempt from local taxes. Such companies are convenient for 
provision of tourist services, international commerce, and international ship-
ping services.  
There are certain restrictions to the operations of offshore companies 
in our country. Offshore companies cannot operate in some of the most im-
portant sectors, such as insurance, banking, social and pension insurance, 
sports, gambling, financial auditing, etc. These restrictions apply not only to 
offshore companies but also to affiliated companies. For example, if someone 
wants to run a football club and owns a company registered in Mauritius, he 
will not be granted a license for this activity. In such case the offshore com-
pany may register a subsidiary in Bulgaria and the subsidiary will get a li-
cense. However, according to our legislation this will not happen because the 
parent company and the subsidiary are affiliated entities.  
However, there are certain exceptions from this rule. Offshore compa-
nies established in countries with which our country has signed tax treaties are 
not likely to evade taxes and are allowed to perform the above activities. The 
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same applies to companies whose owners are publicly known because they 
are listed on regulated financial and capital markets. Another exception are 
the printed media companies. Offshore companies may issue magazines pro-
vided that they have disclosed the identity of their owners.  
Offshore companies that are not subject to restrictions are listed in the 
Commercial Register and anyone can obtain information about their actual 
owners. 
After ten months of investigations, the European Union created and 
disclosed a “blacklist” of 17 countries designated as tax havens. In December 
2017, following a meeting in Brussels, EU finance ministers announced that 
South Korea, American Samoa, Macao, Bahrain, Panama, Barbados, Grenada, 
Guam, Marshall Islands, Tunisia, Mongolia, United Arab Emirates, Namibia, 
Saint Lucia, Samoa, Trinidad and Tobago do not apply minimum global 
standards against tax avoidance and that the EU will update the list at least 
once a year.  
The last list does not include a number of British overseas territories 
such as the Cayman Islands and the Bermuda Islands, which were on the pre-
vious "blacklist” published in June 2015. This was very important for the 
United Kingdom. The disputes over the methodology of the list resulted in its 
subsequent revision. The lack of unconditionally proved tax havens in the list 
is an argument for some MEPs and tax consultancy companies to denounce it 
as a "whitewash” and “sweeping of previous errors under the carpet.” 
The current list was drawn up by a group of finance ministers from the 
EU Member States, including the United Kingdom, on the basis of the Euro-
pean Council's Code of Conduct. The main criterion for inclusion in the 
blacklist is the facilitation of tax avoidance. Although this is a step in the right 
direction, the EU leaders did not include too many tax havens in the list to 
everyone’s detriment.  
Tax evasion means less government spending on healthcare, education 
and anti-poverty measures. 
About 50 other countries are included in the so-called gray list of 
countries that do not comply with EU tax standards but are committed to 
change their rules on tax transparency as soon as possible. These countries 
will have to adopt EU rules by the end of 2018 and the developing countries 
will have to do so by 2019. This is their only chance to avoid inclusion in the 
main blacklist of countries used as tax havens. This initiative has already 
proved its effectiveness, as many countries have committed to meet the dead-
lines for compliance with the European criteria. The EU will regularly review 
and update the list in the coming years to ensure that good tax governance is 
provided for by the national regulations in the countries currently included in 
the EU lists. The compilation and publication of the first blacklist was an im-
portant achievement in the process for transparency and fairness. However, 
the process should not stop at this point. The listed countries should be put 
under increasing pressure to change their tax governance. All blacklisted ju-
risdictions should face certain sanctions and restrictions and the graylisted 
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ones should keep their commitment to achieve the set goals quickly and effec-
tively.  
Members of the European Parliament and activists, however, criticize 
the exclusion of some countries from the lists. They believe that this under-
mines the EU’s credibility and that the member states have made certain con-
cessions regarding the tax havens included in the black list by leaving out the 
most important ones. The exclusion of major financial centres, such as the 
United States of America, makes the list politically biased. Other activists 
criticize the list of tax havens that was originally intended to be based on an 
objective set of criteria. The list seems to be a political decision for EU mem-
bers who choose to “name and shame” the most disadvantaged countries. The 
result of this process is a bureaucratic list that includes only economically 
weak and politically unaffiliated regions.  
This list is also criticized by the fact that some EU member states, 
such as Luxembourg, Ireland and the Netherlands, are excluded from it, alt-
hough they are the largest profit transfer centres. Moreover, the United King-
dom is trying to exclude its overseas dominions from the blacklist. 
More than 50 jurisdictions have already made serious commitments to 
undertake reforms. Countries on this list are advised to take certain legislative 
measures regarding individual and corporate holders of offshore accounts.  
While recognizing that the EU blacklisting criteria fail to capture all 
corporate tax havens, Oxfam has conducted a fairly conservative assessment 
showing which countries should at the very least be expected to appear on the 
EU blacklist of tax havens if the EU were to objectively apply its own criteria 
and not bow to any political pressure. 
Oxfam evaluated the 92 jurisdictions being screened by the EU listing 
process, against the EU’s three criteria: 
• Criterion 1: Tax transparency: Countries are exchanging information 
automatically and on request; countries are part of the Multilateral Conven-
tion on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters. 
• Criterion 2: Fair taxation: Countries have no harmful preferential tax 
measures; countries do not facilitate offshore structures or arrangements 
aimed at attracting profits which do not reflect real economic activity in the 
jurisdiction. Zero percent tax rate is used as an indicator. It is important to 
note that the EU did not disclose the exact methodology for how it will assess 
this criterion. Oxfam therefore used economic indicators aiming at only cap-
turing countries granting tax advantages without any real economic activity 
taking place in that country. However, the EU should have more information 
than is publicly available and could therefore list more countries than Oxfam 
does in this assessment; 
• Criterion 3: Implementation of anti-BEPS measures: Countries apply 
or commit to OECD anti-BEPS (Base erosion and profit shifting) minimum 
standards. This assessment resulted in a list of 27 countries that should appear 
on the EU blacklist, as shown in Table 1: 
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Table 1 
Countries that should appear on the EU blacklist according  
to the three criteria 
 
Jurisdiction Fails criterion 1: Tax 
transparency 
Fails criterion 2: 
Fair taxation 
Fails criterion 3: 
Implementation of anti-
BEPS measures 
Albania   X 
Anguilla   X 
Antigua and Barbuda X  X 
Aruba   X 
Bahamas  X X 
Bermuda  X  
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
X  X 
British Virgin 
Islands 
 X  
Cook Islands   X 
Cayman Islands  X  
Curaçao   X  
Macedonia X  X 
Gibraltar   X 
Hong Kong  X  
Jersey  X  
Mauritius  X  
Montenegro X  X 
Nauru   X 
Niue   X 
Oman X  X 
Serbia X   
Switzerland  X  
Taiwan X  X 
US Virgin Islands X  X 
Vanuatu X  X 
Faroe Islands   X 
New Caledonia X  X 
 
EU finance ministers urge countries to ratify the European list of tax 
havens and claim that such a list should be imposed with credible and 
meaningful sanctions. The potential sanctions that could be imposed on the 
listed countries are expected to be agreed upon shortly. This is an important 
step in the ongoing war against tax evasion and avoidance on a global scale. 
 
*     *    * 
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At the ECOFIN meeting held in January 2018 the Bulgarian Finance 
Minister Vladislav Goranov stated that Bulgaria was ready to implement a 
common methodology for calculation of corporate income tax base, i.e. to 
harmonize its tax legislation with the other EU member states. Until recently, 
our country was opposed to this measure because the corporate income tax 
rate in Bulgarian is lower 10%) although the tax base is wider than in other 
countries and there are fewer tax concessions and exemptions as well as rec-
ognized costs. Should a narrower base is adopted, this could lead to a correc-
tion of tax rates in Bulgaria as well. Moreover, the adoption of a common tax 
base will lead to the next step – profit consolidation, which means that com-
panies will be liable to pay the tax in the country where they actually operate 
instead of the country of their registration. This will effectively prevent tax 
avoidance by means of transferring profits to tax havens. Despite the low cor-
porate tax rate in Bulgaria, few companies have taken advantage of our juris-
diction. Instead, many companies registered in the country prefer to transfer 
their profits to other jurisdictions seeking the protection of "anonymous" 
ownership and the privilege to accumulate capital resources at low or zero 
taxes. 
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